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RECENT
DECISIONS
Ryan: State v.
Montana Livestock
Sanitary Board

It is hoped that when this case is noted in the future, it will be recognized that the court was anxious to reach what it considered a desirable
result." Such recognition will avoid undue weight being placed on the
rules of law and construction adhered to in this decision.
DOUGLAS C. ALLEN

WRIT OF PROIIBITION-JURISDICTION

OF DISTRICT COURTS-PowER TO

RESTRAIN MINISTERIAL ACTs-The Montana Livestock Sanitary Board is-

sued an order declaring Rosebud County a "disease control area" and ordered the respondent to present his cattle for brucellosis testing. Respondent obtained an alternative writ of prohibition from the district court. The
Board moved to quash the writ on the ground that prohibition was not the
proper remedy to test its orders which were ministerial in nature and were
within its statutory jurisdiction. The motion was denied and, after hearing,, a peremptory writ issued. On appeal to the Montana Supreme Court,
held, judgment reversed and motion to quash granted. The statute permitting a district court to issue the writ of prohibition is unconstitutional
insofar as it applies to ministerial acts. State v. Montana Livestock Sanitary Board, 339 P.2d 487 (Mont. 1959).
The first Montana statute defining prohibition was enacted in 1877
but did not mention ministerial acts.' The Montana constitution was
adopted in 1889. Subsequently the statute was amended to its present form.
It provides?

The writ of prohibition is the counterpart of the writ of mandate.
It arrests the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or
person, whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, when
such proceedings are without or in excess of the jurisdiction of such
tribunal, corporation, board, or person.
That the Supreme Court of Montana is powerless to issue the writ of
prohibition to restrain ministerial acts has been settled. In State ex rel.
Sc.arnikow v.Hogan" the petitioner sought a writ of prohibition to restrain
the Secretary of State from certifying a Democratic nominee for district
judge. The court held that it did not have the power, notwithstanding the
statute, to restrain ministerial functions. Rather the court felt bound by
the constitution to the scope of the writ as it existed at common-law. For
authority the court relied upon two California decisions, Maurer v. Mitchell'
"'As before suggested it is questionable whether the court actually did reach a de-

sireable result; for if the word "herein" In the will is a word of limitation the
court has defeated the trustor's intention by this decision.
'Laws of the Territory of Montana, 1877, § 561, at 184.
2REVISED CODES OF MONTANA, 1947, § 93-9201.
24 Mont. 379, 62 Pac. 493 (1900).

'53 Cal. 289 (1878).
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and Ca-mron v. Kenfield.' In reference to a California statute identical
to ours the court in the Maurer case stated:'
We are all of opinion that the writ mentioned in the constitution is
the writ of prohibition as known to the common-law. Nor does the
language of section 1102 of the Code of Civil Procedure require of
us to hold that the office of the writ has been extended, or that it
should now issue in cases in which it could not have been resorted
to prior to the statute.
It was expressly declared in the Hogan case, however, that nothing in the
court's opinion is to be understood as denying to district courts the jurisdiction conferred by the statute. A similar reservation appeared'in the
Coamran case.'

The quest ion before the court in the instant case was whether district
cotrts may be granted jurisdiction to restrain ministerial functions by prohibition. Again, the court adopted the reasoning of an early California
decision, Farmers' Co-operative Union v. Thresher,"which said :*
This case is within the principle decided in Camron v. Kenfield,
57 Cal. 550, in which it was held that the Legislature could not enlarge or extend the office of the writ of prohibition so as to include ministerial functions. We perceive no distinction, in this regard, in the provisions of the Constitution relating to the Supreme
Court and the Superior Courts.
This reasoning might well be correct if the conclusion of the court in the
instant case is correct where with reference to the powers of the two court
systems it states "the jurisdiction of each of them is likewise provided by
constitutional grant.'"" It seems, however, that there may be basis for saying that the Montana constitution treats the supreme court and the district
courts differently. The power of the supreme court to issue extraordinary
writs such as prohibition is set forth specifically as an exception to the provision that the supreme court shall have appellate jurisdiction only, and no
such qualification appears in the constitution respecting the like power
granted to the district courts.'
"57 Cal. 550
OSupra note
'Supra note
'62 Cal. 407
Od. at 410.

(1881).
4 at 291-292.
5 at 554.
(1882).

'Instant case at 491.

While the state constitutions are' instruments of limitation,

rather than grant, with reference to the power of the legislature, it is unclear
whether the same is true of the judiciary. See Forsell, What is the Nature of the
Montana Constitution?, 15 MONT. L. REv. 93, 100 (1954), where the author sug-

gests that the nature of the grants of power to the different Montana court sys-

tems should be separately analyzed.
'The supreme court provisions are phrased as of grant. Art. VIII, § 2, provides:
"The supreme court, except as otherwise provided in this constiution, shall hhve
appellate jurisdiction only ..
" Art. VIII, § 3, continues: "Said court shall have
power in its discretion to issue and to hear and determine writs of ... prohibition
...
and such other original and remedial writs as may be necessary or proper to
the complete exercise of Its appellate jurisdiction." Compare this with the district
courts provision, art. VIII, § 11, seemingly recognizing their general power: "The
district courts -shall have original jurisdiction in all cases at law and in equity....
Said courts and the judges thereof shall have power also to Issue, hear and determine writs of... prohibition . .. and other original and remedial writs..
. ." The
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At any rate the Montana court, relying on an 1882 California case, has
failed to point out the more recent trend in that state liberalizing the use
of extraordinary writs :1'

In Stoehr v. Superior Court, [cite], mortgaged chattels were attached, and the mortgagee, pursuant to statute, demanded that the
attaching creditor pay the mortgage or release the property. The
attaching creditor failed to do so, but the lower court made an
erroneous order directing the sheriff not to release it and the
sheriff accordingly refused to release. Thus the petitioner was
confronted with a completed judicial act which he claimed was in
excess of jurisdiction. Mandamus would hardly lie against the
sheriff who was acting pursuant to a court order as yet unattacked;
mandamus would not lie against the trial court to compel the release because it was not holding the property (the sheriff was) ;
and, certiorari would not lie to annul the courts order because it
was reviewable on appeal. Somehow the property wrongfully held
had to be released, and relief in the nature of mandamus-to compel the sheriff, a ministerial officer, to release it, had to be given.
Accordingly prohibitionissued to "restrain respondent [superior
court] from refusing to release" the property; i.e., the objective of
mandamus to the ministerial officer was obtained by prohibition
against the court, with the effect of certiorari (annulment of the
invalid order).
This unique type of relief was aptly termed "mandamatory prohibition"
by the California commentator. By similar holdings, "certiorarified prohibition, '. "certiorarified mandamus,' ....
prohibitory mandamus,' ' and
others apparently have been created." (Perhaps the petitioner in the instant
case should have sought mandamus to compel the board nat to perform its
ministerial duty!)
Any attempt to reconcile the present California position with the
Maurer, Camron, and Farmers' holdings proves difficult, to say the least.
If the constitution limits the character and function of the extraordinary
writs so as to preclude their enlargment by statute, surely the courts cannot
justify the technique of escaping the limitations of one writ by enlarging
the scope or function of another. Why, then, are the California courts permitting such obviously artificial practices? The question has been answered
thus :"

difference in language seems significant. If the constitution intended to recognize
the judicial power in the courts of general jurisdiction and simply describes or
limits its exercise, there might be justification for permitting the legislature to extend the writs to cover new subject matter. If the constitution intended to grant
the district courts only such authority as is specially set out, the legislature could
not extend that authority. A definitive treatment of this complicated and intriguing constitutional question is beyond the scope of this recent decision.
'43 WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PnocmURE 2573 (1954).
'aSee Beard v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. App. 2d 284, 102 P.2d 1087 (1940).
"See Andrews v. Superior Court, 29 Cal. 2d 208, 174 P.2d 313 (1946).
'See Simmons v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 2d 119, 214 P.2d 844 (1950).
12
See generally 3 WrrKIN, CALIFORNIA PRDczDuRE 2571 (1954), for a discussion of
these various mutations and cases where they have occurred.
'729 CAT. S.B.J. 467, 469 (1954).
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They are not doing it for fun, nor for judicial perversity; nor are
they deluded by professional incompetents representing petitioners.
They have a very good reason: the archiac system of appellate review is bursting at the seams; the irresistible demand for a review
denied by normal procedure has been met by this ingenious expansion of these historical forms, in the best traditions of the clerks
of chancery.
This reference to the "archiac system of appellate review" is certainly
justified. The present multitude of administrative boards, bureaus, and
agencies had no counterpart in the government of the mid-1800's when the
California and Montana constitutions were framed. Nevertheless, there
has not been a serious attempt to overhaul the system of review since that
time.
The Washington constitutional provisions regarding the jurisdiction
of the supreme and superior courts are substantially the same as corresponding sections of the Montana and California constitutions. The Washington decisions in this area, however, are distinctly dissimilar.
In the instant case the Montana Supreme Court relies on the Washington case of State ex ret. White v. Board of State Land Commissioners' but
it is not in point because it held only that the Washington Supreme Court
could not issue the writ against a ministerial act. Windsor v. Bridges,"
decided the same year, expressly disapproved the rationale of the Farmers'
case as applied to the Washington superior courts. Although the Windsor
case denied the supreme court power to issue the ministerial writ, with
respect to the superior courts it quoted with approval the following :'
" [T]he legislature, in pursuance of its authority given by the organic act to legislate upon all 'rightful subjects of legislation' has
seen fit, and has the undoubted right, as occasions arise, to create
new offenses, new subjects for judicial investigation and new ways
and means to enforce the authority of the courts and officers and
we can see no reason to conclude that the giving of additional power to the writ of prohibition was not a 'rightful subject of legislation.' " People v. House, 4 Utah 369, 10 Pac. 838 [1886].
In Washington today there are two recognized writs of prohibition:
the constitutional or common-law writ issued by the supreme court, and
the statutory writ issued only by the superior courts, which includes ministerial acts. The statutory writ has been quite useful in testing the validity of legislation and the legality of governmental action, since the only
requirements for its issuance are inadequacy of appeal and contemplated
action in excess of jurisdiction.'
By reason of the Windsor case, the Washington legislature is permitted
to revise the extraordinary writs issued by the superior courts to keep pace
with the changing requirements of judicial review. California, on the other
"823 Wash. 700, 63 Pac. 532 (1901).
' 24 Wash. 540, 64 Pac. 780 (1901).
"Id., 64 Pac. at 783. Dictum approved in People v. Hinkle, 130 Wash. 419, 227 Pac.
861, 864 (1924).
"Larson, Administrative Determinations and the EmitraordinaryWrits in the State
of 'Washington, 20 WASH. L. REv. 81, 89 (1945).
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hand, has said that, barring constitutional amendment, the writs are limited
in scope to the common-law writs existing when the constitution was adopted.
In actual practice, however, the courts there have devised ingenious mutations of the writs to grant the relief needed. This approach is certain to
result in great confusion if it has not already done so.
The Montana court in adhering to the California approach apparently
has closed the door on the possibility of modifying the writs by legislative
action. It is reasonable to assume that the problem of adequate appellate
review of actions of administrative tribunals will become more acute as
this state continues to increase in population and begins to realize its economic and industrial potential. No doubt the best solution to the problem
would be appropriate constitutional amendment, if required, coupled with a
revision of the entire system of review, or adoption of some such statute as
the Model Administrative Procedure Act.' But if such measures are not
forthcoming it is entirely possible that Montana will follow the California
lead further, as it has often done in the past. Indeed, it is not at all unlikely that one day we, in Montana, might be seeking a writ of "mandamatory prohibition" or "certiorarified mandamus."
MELVYN M. RYAN

'The model act was presented in the last legislature but failed of passage.
Montana Legislative Assembly, S. B. 179.
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